# THE WORLD-WORK-TEXT CIRCLE

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# FROM THE ARTISTIC CIRCLE TO THE SEMIOTIC WORK-TEXT CIRCLE

- «Artistic interpretation produces a non-linguistic text. Likewise**, the viewer's initial encounter with an artwork has a perceptual rather than a linguistic nature**. Both artist and viewer are engaged in a non-linguistic hermeneutic exchange of interpretation and understanding» (Kay-Wand 2018: 112).
- Kay-Wand (2018: 110) also accounts for visual-olfactory art (*Present Tense* by Mona Hatoum, a work of art made by engraving the Oslo Accords' map on olive oil soap).
- Yet, according to Emilio Garroni (2005: 39-45), there is a *correlation between perception and language* (see Ghilardi 2014: 33-45,  for a similar claim).
- **There should be a semiotic work-text circle blending non-linguistic and linguistic semiosis**.

# WORLD = A CONTINUUM BETWEEN INNER AND OUTER WORLD THROUGH LANGUAGE

- «We live in two worlds, a world of **fact** and a world of **fancy**» (Peirce 1998: 369).

- «[…] language as such knows **no distinction between external and internal** ‘things’: the objects of imagination are understood exactly alike with the objects of sensible perception through language» (Coseriu 1967: 14, my translation)

- «[…] even when **explicit and thoughtful hypotheses** lead perceptual engagement, these **have a feedback on perception**. They [the hypotheses] can make us *consider* – and, in some sense, *see* – the same object, for instance a book, as a reading tool, a typographic product, a paper material sample, […] and so forth. […] Shortly, **we *see* something this or that way depending on the hypothesis we have in mind**» (Garroni 2005: 18-19, my translation).

# IMAGINATION LANGUAGE FIGURATION

Firstness = mental images
Secondness, degenerate Secondness
= physical phenomena
Thirdness = conventional reality

- Action
- Reaction




- Figures, diagrams, and metaphors in the physical world
- Art as **figuration** is degenerate secondness because its **production or enactment** is constrained by matter and convention rather than matter alone.
- **Photography and cinema** are indexical without losing an iconic component.

Chinese and Japanese calligraphy

can represent

Scientific representation

- Imagination
- **Exemplification in fi...** (figures =patterns in the physical world, not just depiction)
- Realization in symbols

- Symbols as stipulations

**Ekphrasis** is a complex phenomenon.

It **represents art in literature** and, as a feedback on perception, **takes art as part of the outer world**, **translating it** into the inner one **through perception**, and then **stipulating a description of art perception**.

# NELSON GOODMAN ON WORLDMAKING

- **A world is always made of other worlds** (Goodman 1978: 6) by decomposition and composition (Goodman 1978: 7-10).
- The figuration of an image occurs by selecting parts of the outer world and composing them according to the image (see Garroni 2005: 77). Yet, a figure is not an image.
- A figure is part of the art world (degenerate Secondness) and exemplifies the inner-worldly image (Firstness).
- **The art world comes from the inner and outer worlds**.
- **Art worlds differ** because of the emphasis on different figurative aspects of the same image-scheme: «a Piero della Francesca *Christ* and a Rembrandt one belong to worlds organized into different kinds» (Goodman 1978: 11).
- Ekphrasis forgets some figurative aspects to describe an artwork, while the figuration of a literary character adds aspects not stipulated by narrative fiction (see Goodman 1978: 14-16).

**Ekphrasis builds a literary world out of artistic ones, while the reverse process (illustration) builds an artistic world out of a literary one.**

# GOODMAN ON FICTION

- «Fiction […] whether written or painted or acted, applies truly neither to nothing nor to diaphanous possible worlds but, **albeit metaphorically**, to actual worlds. Somewhat as I have argued **elsewhere** that the merely possible–so far as admissible at all–lies within the actual, so we might say here again, in a different context, that the so-called possible worlds of fiction lie within actual worlds. Fiction operates in actual worlds in much the same way as nonfiction» (Goodman 1978: 104).
- **Elsewhere =** «Predicates supposedly pertaining to them are seen to apply to actual things, but to have extentions related in peculiar ways to, and usually broader than, the extentions of certain manifest predicates» (Goodman 1983 [1953]: 57). Raspa will elaborate on this claim.
- Despite not building directly on the outer world, **ekphrasis takes the artwork as part of it**.
- **Ekphrasis describes through assumption** since the work might be imaginary or no longer exist.
- The ekphrasis is the **description of a perception of the artwork**, rather than a description of the artwork itself (the latter is a case of scientific representation).

# LITERATURE AS SYMBOL (A STIPULATED AND INCOMPLETE SIGN)

- In narrative fiction, «**once** assumed–but one might say **stipulated** [convention between author and reader]–that **an object possesses a certain property**, it then has that property» (Raspa 2011: 181-182, my translation);
- «Let the **sentence** […] be 'Ezekiel loveth Huldah.' […] Now the effect of the word 'loveth' is that the pair of objects denoted by the pair of **indices**, Ezekiel and Huldah, is represented by the **icon, or the image** we have in our minds of a lover and his beloved» (Peirce 1998: 17).

In Perice, sentences are **symbols (conventional signs)**, **indices** are signs i**nteract**ing **with their objects**, and **icons** somehow **resemble** their objects.

- «Exactly because they are incomplete [fictional or imaginary objects], the reader can **complete them with** her **imagination**» (Raspa 2014: 158, my translation).

# FICTIONAL OBJECTS IN THE CIRCLE

Fictional objects are **created out of imagination** in the inner world.

Narrative stipulation makes them **real but still incomplete**.

Literary symbols generate images in the reader’s imagination. **Different readers’ images can still correspond to the same imaginative scheme**.

«We know from the fairytale that Snow White has dark hair; yet let us assume that, in **Cinderella**’s tale, it is said that she **has long hair without saying what color**. I read the fairytale to two children. **One imagines that Cinderella is blonde while the other imagines she is dark-haired**» (Raspa 2014: 158-159, my translation).

These images of the same long-haired image-scheme can be manifested in different figures. EXAMPLE:  A child can picture a dark-haired Cinderella against Disney’s figurative stipulation. **The way the child draws Cinderella depends on how she imagines Cinderella**.

# IMAGE-SCHEMES AS TRANSWORLD MODELS

- «What is possible is incomplete by nature. Possibility does not regard here the fact that **Emma Bovary's story** might happen in a possible world–it is not to be excluded, but that is not my point–, it rather regards the fact that her story **indirectly speaks or might speak of many stories**» (Raspa 2014: 159, my translation).
- *The **image-scheme** is a **shared model** for outerworldly phenomena, figures, fiction, chronicles, fantasies, and dreams.*

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